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It is known that the effectiveness of macro policies depends on the 
exchange-rate regime.  Pertinent models have typically considered 
either fixed or floating rates rather than mixed regimes.  In recent 
years, however, the dollar has floated against most currencies, while 
being fixed against the yuan.  This paper argues that a flex-price, 
dual-rate model consisting of the U.S., China and the Eurozone, 
combined with distinct adjustment patterns in tradables and non-
tradables sectors and a tendency for policy makers to treat inflation 
in housing as pure asset inflation, provides a plausible explanation of 
the great moderation and its aftermath.     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The effectiveness of macro stabilization policies is known to depend on 
the exchange rate regime.  Monetary policy, for example, is ineffective in a 
small open economy with fixed exchange rates and high capital mobility, but 
very potent under floating rates.  In the IMF’s classification of exchange-rate 
regimes, countries are either floaters of various types or peggers of various 
types.  In that scheme, the U.S. is officially classified as an “independent 
floater” (IMF, 2008; Fischer, 2001).    
In the Bretton-Woods system, a country’s currency was fixed against all 
member currencies, which at the time typically meant all major trading 
partners.  The European Monetary System (EMS), on the other hand, was 
more of a mixed regime, with each member’s currency fixed against every 
other member, but with the bloc of EMS currencies floating against the U.S. 
dollar and other major currencies.  
Over the years, many small countries have tied their currencies to the 
dollar.  Their small size vis-à-vis the U.S. meant that their currencies floated 
against other currencies in patterns beyond their control.  China also fixes its 
currency against the dollar, but China is not small.  The implications of this 
difference have recently been explored in the context of a short-run, sticky-
price, Mundell-Fleming-type of model (Arndt, 2011) and of a medium-term 
model in which prices are flexible (Arndt, 2012).  There it has been shown 
that China’s unilateral exchange market intervention has significant effects 
on adjustment of the U.S. economy to domestic and foreign shocks and 
disturbances.  It has also been shown that, unlike small countries, Chinese 
intervention interferes with U.S. policy autonomy.  
This paper amends the aforementioned flex-price, dual-rate model by 
specifying the real side of the U.S. economy as consisting of tradables and 
non-tradables sectors.  It argues that economic developments beginning in 
the early nineties and ending in the latter part of the first decade of this 
century were materially influenced by the mixed-rate regime, but that other 
considerations also came into play.  The two-sector structure of the market 
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for goods and services allows movements in relative prices to affect the 
allocation of labor and other scarce resources in the macro economy.  In this 
model, price moderation due to foreign competition has larger effects on the 
tradables sector than on the non-tradables sector.  The resulting relative price 
movements have important consequences.   
A key component of the non-tradables sector is housing and in a high-
employment economy, cost pressures arising in such an important sector are 
easily spread to the rest of the economy.  At the time, however, the housing 
bubble was widely viewed as asset inflation and hence not as a sign of an 
overheating economy.  In retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight, it 
would probably have been prudent to treat inflation in new housing, and in 
new structures more generally, as a sign of overheating.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 outlines the basic model, 
focusing on the effects of a monetary expansion on economic activity when 
the output gap is large and when it is small.  It assumes that capital mobility 
is high between the U.S. and Europe, but low with China.  Section 3 takes a 
closer look at the interaction between tradables and non-tradables sectors as 
the economy moves toward and then surpasses the full employment level of 
output.  It argues that high demand for non-tradables leads not only to price 
inflation in that sector, but to cost inflation throughout the economy.  Section 
4 summarizes the main elements and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
The framework is an open-economy macro model in which prices are 
flexible and the economy is divided into tradables and non-tradables sectors.  
The focus economy is the U.S., whose currency fluctuates freely against the 
euro, but is fixed against the yuan.      
The money market is modeled in the familiar manner, with real high-
powered money, defined as nominal money supply (H) divided by the price 
level (P) equal to real money demand (L).  The latter consists of transactions 
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demand, as a positive function of real income (y) and asset demand, as a 
negative function of the interest rate on non-monetary assets (i). 
 
/ ( ,  ).H P L y i                                             (1) 
 
Goods and services equilibrium is given by the following equation: 
 
* *( ) ( ,  ,  ,  ,  ) ( ) ,c cI i T y y y e e S y G                    (2) 
 
where investment (I) is a negative function of the rate of interest (i); and the 
trade balance (or current account, (T) worsens with domestic output (y), 
improves with foreign incomes, and improves with a real depreciation of the 
dollar.  Real exchange rates *e  and ,ce  against the euro and yuan, 
respectively, are defined as the respective nominal exchange rates adjusted 
by ratios of foreign to U.S. price indexes.  Domestic saving is a positive 
function of domestic income and G represents the government deficit. 
 
  
As noted, an important difference between the Eurozone and China is the 
degree of capital mobility, which is assumed to be high with respect to the 
former and low with respect to the latter.  The dollar-euro relationship is 
represented by the uncovered interest parity condition, 
 
exp *
*
*
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,
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E

                                (3) 
 
where expE  and *E  are the expected future spot and the current spot rate 
between the dollar and the euro, respectively.  For present purposes, 
expectations are assumed to follow an AR process, so that a rise in the 
current spot rate unambiguously reduces the right-hand side of the equation.    
Bilateral balance of payments equilibrium between the U.S. and China is 
represented by the following expression: 
 
( ,  ,  ) ( ) 0,c c c c c cT y y e K i i R                                 (4) 
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where cK  represents autonomous capital inflows from China in response to 
an increase in U.S. interest rates or a decline in Chinese interest rates and 
where cR  represents dollar accumulation by the central bank of China. 
As noted above, prices are flexible and price movements involving 
tradable goods and services may differ from those occurring in non-tradables 
sectors.  The freedom of domestic firms to raise tradables prices is 
constrained by foreign competition.  Domestic import-competing firms 
cannot raise their prices without losing home market share, just as domestic 
exporting firms cannot raise prices without risking the loss of market share 
abroad.  Producers of non-tradable goods and services face much more 
limited pricing constraints.  Equilibrium prices in their markets are 
determined where domestic production satisfies domestic demand.
 
The overall price level is defined as follows: 
 
* *(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ,c ct n t t nP p p E p E p p                           (5) 
 
where tp  and np  are tradables and non-tradables prices, respectively; 
*
tp   
and ctp  are the euro and yuan prices of tradable imports from the Eurozone 
and China, respectively; and where   is the share of tradables in U.S. GDP.  
With the nominal dollar-yuan rate fixed and assuming that tradables prices in 
foreign currency are given, the domestic price level will change for two 
reasons.  First, a change in the dollar-euro rate will change it and, secondly, 
variations in non-tradables prices will do so as well. 
Production costs and thus price pressures are assumed to rise throughout 
the economy as the output gap shrinks.  In the non-tradables sector, this leads 
to actual price increases.  If we assume that the level of potential output is 
given, then domestic non-tradables prices rise with actual GDP, that is, 
 
( ).n np p y                                           (6) 
 
In this model, a large output gap means that the main effect of monetary 
expansion is on output rather than prices.
 
 But as the output gap narrows, 
Sven W. Arndt 180 
Figure 1 Adjustment in a Dual Exchange Rate Regime 
increasing portions of a liquidity injection will go into price increases rather 
than output expansion.  In other words, the medium-run aggregate supply 
curve becomes steeper as the output gap falls.  Thus, the coefficient nyp  rises 
as the output gap shrinks, meaning that non-tradables prices rise in a non-
linear manner as the economy approaches full employment. 
 
  
Figure 1 summarizes the effects of an expansionary monetary policy in a 
dual-rate regime.  We focus on monetary policy, because our main interest is 
in understanding and assessing the Fed’s role in the great moderation and its 
aftermath.  The curves in figure 1 represent the money market (LL), goods 
and services equilibrium (GG), uncovered interest parity between the dollar 
and the euro (UIP), and the bilateral balance of payments between the U.S. 
and China (B
c
B
c
), respectively.  The last curve is steeply sloped in order to 
reflect low capital mobility between the U.S. and China. 
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A monetary expansion in the U.S. shifts the LL curve to the right.  The 
new LL curve’s intersection with the initial GG curve achieves internal 
balance, but leaves an external disequilibrium with respect to both China and 
the Eurozone.  The rise in U.S. economic activity worsens both current 
accounts, while the decline in the U.S. interest rate causes both financial 
accounts to deteriorate as well.  The dollar depreciates nominally against the 
euro, moving the UIP curve down and the GG curve out.  The nominal 
depreciation raises the dollar prices of imports from the Eurozone, tending to 
switch expenditure to domestic substitutes and strengthening the 
effectiveness of the monetary expansion in its ability to reduce the output gap 
and raise employment.   
The rise in the dollar prices of imports has a direct effect on the U.S. price 
level, as shown in equation (5).  Further, unless supply conditions in U.S. 
tradables sectors are infinitely elastic, the demand shift toward U.S. goods 
and services provokes cost pressures throughout the economy.  The effect of 
any price increase in figure 1 is to shift the LL, GG and B
c
B
c
 curves to the 
left, thereby tending to weaken the effectiveness of the monetary expansion 
(Arndt, 2012).  This is because it is movements in the real exchange rate that 
determine the extent of expenditure switching.  Against the euro, the dollar’s 
real depreciation declines for any given nominal depreciation as U.S. 
inflation heats up.  Against the yuan, where the nominal rate is fixed, the rise 
in U.S. prices is equivalent to dollar appreciation. These pressures on 
domestic prices typically become stronger as the output gap narrows, thereby 
gradually weakening the efficacy of the monetary expansion.  The system 
approaches monetary neutrality.   
In the yuan/dollar market, the central bank of China intervenes to prevent 
the yuan from appreciating, mopping up excess dollars in the process.  This 
situation is reflected in the figure by the difference between the two B
c
B
c
 
curves.  Under floating rates, the dollar would depreciate against the yuan 
and the bilateral payments curve would shift to the right to pass through a 
point like C.  It is not point C, because the GG curve through C does not 
reflect the yuan appreciation that would occur under floating rates.   With the 
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rate fixed, the autonomous payments curve does not shift.  The B
c
B
c
 curve 
through point C represents the sum of autonomous and accommodating 
transactions.  The gap between the two curves reflects the extent of Chinese 
dollar accumulation.
1)
  
In the “automatic” adjustment mechanism under fixed rates, the Chinese 
intervention that pulls U.S. money out of circulation weakens the stimulus 
generated by the initial money expansion.  In the present case, however, this 
does not happen, because the Chinese authorities recycle their intervention 
dollars by purchasing U.S. Treasury securities from the public.  Hence, the 
Chinese intervention not only annuls the price adjustment mechanism of 
floating rates by fixing the rate, but having fixed the rate,  it short-circuits the 
adjustment mechanism of fixed-rate systems by sterilization and thus makes 
the bilateral payments imbalance “permanent.”   
It is in this sense that China would have to share the blame for the lack of 
adjustment in the U.S. economy, the persistence of current account 
imbalances, and the financial and economic upheavals that followed.  It is 
also in this sense that China’s exchange-rate policy is a beggar-thy-neighbor 
policy.  For the rest of the world, meanwhile, the fundamental question is 
how to provide some degree of protection from and defense against risky and 
disruptive policies in large countries.     
As noted earlier, stable foreign prices can be an important source of price 
moderation in the United States.  Here, the size of the Chinese economy and 
the rapid emergence of China as a low-price supplier of a wide array of 
consumer goods played a key role.  The ready availability of those goods was 
due in part to the wide gap between Chinese production and domestic 
absorption, a gap which has sometimes been described as a savings glut.  
When Chinese export prices are stable and the yuan is fixed to the dollar, 
equation (5) tells us that the main sources of price inflation are reduced to 
dollar depreciation against the euro and price inflation in the Eurozone, on 
                                                 
1) The rise in U.S. prices discussed above will actually shift the original BcBc curve to the left, 
as indicated by the horizontal arrow.  The gap between this curve (not drawn) and the curve 
through point C represents the extent of intervention by the Chinese authorities.  It also 
reflects the magnitude of the U.S. autonomous payments deficit with China. 
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the one hand, and inflation in non-tradables in the U.S., on the other hand.    
 
 
3. THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE  
IN A FULLY EMPLOYED ECONOMY 
 
When the domestic output gap is large and the monetary expansion raises 
the demand for goods and services, the derived increase in demand for labor 
and other factors of production can be easily satisfied by drawing on 
unemployed resources.  Any pressures on wages and other factor costs 
should thus be moderate.  When the economy operates at high levels of 
employment, on the other hand, a rise in demand for non-tradables can only 
be satisfied by drawing productive resources away from tradables industries.  
A sustained rise in the demand for non-tradables, such as that seen in the 
years preceding the financial crisis, may be expected to raise wages and other 
factor prices, not only in non-tradables sectors but throughout the economy.   
Since non-tradables producers face little or no foreign competition, they 
may pass on such cost increases to higher prices.  Tradables producers, on 
the other hand, are limited by foreign competition in their ability to pass cost 
increases through to prices.  Rising costs in the face of pricing constraints 
squeeze profits, forcing producers to limit production in both exportables and 
import-competing industries.  Some firms deal with these pressures through 
offshore sourcing or even offshore production, while less competitive or 
agile firms leave the industry.  Both types of actions tend to free up 
productive resources for transfer into non-tradables sectors.   
Figure 2 provides a simple representation of the problem.  The relative 
price of tradables is measured vertically as the ratio / ,t np p p  while the 
right and left panels represent demand/supply equilibrium in tradables and 
non-tradables sectors, respectively.  Note the important assumption 
embedded in the construction of tradables prices, namely, that the relative 
price between exports and imports — the terms of trade — remains constant.2)  
                                                 
2) Under the circumstances prevailing in that period, we would expect U.S. export prices to 
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Figure 2 Policy Trade-Offs in a Two Sector Economy 
 
In the right panel, domestic demand falls with a rise in the relative price of 
tradables, while domestic supply rises.  Since the price of non-tradables is in 
the denominator of the price ratio, the slopes of the two curves are reversed 
in the left panel in order to allow the demand for non-tradables to fall when 
the relative price of non-tradables rises and supply to rise.  The horizontal 
axis measures quantity transactions in the two markets, respectively. 
The figure represents a situation in which actual output is at or very near 
the full-employment level in this two-sector economy.  Output combinations 
depicted in the figure, therefore, represent combinations that lie on or near 
the economy’s production possibility curve (not drawn).  Hence, any increase 
of output in one sector must be accompanied by a decline in the other sector.  
Assume that points 0nA  and 0tA  at relative price 0p  represent an initial 
equilibrium.  At the outset, therefore, domestic production of tradables is 
                                                                                                                   
rise relative to import prices, implying an improvement in the country’s terms of trade. 
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assumed to be equal to domestic absorption, so that the country’s current 
account is in balance, with exports equal to imports. 
Now suppose that a monetary expansion causes both demand curves in 
figure 2 to shift out.  As discussed in the previous section, there will be 
upward pressure on both tradables and non-tradables prices, with the latter 
expected to be larger.  This is shown in the figure as a decline in the relative 
price to 1,p  at which the non-tradables market once again clears.   The 
change in p — a real appreciation — must be large enough to return the non-
tradables sector to equilibrium.  Output has risen by drawing productive 
resources from tradables, where output has declined.  In addition, there is 
now a current account deficit, equal to the gap between points 
1sA  and 1.DA   
This deficit is the result not only of the rise in demand for tradables, but also 
of the decline in their production in the U.S. 
The figure reflects stylized facts that were widely noted and discussed, 
namely, that the U.S. current account deficit was large, was growing larger, 
and was seemingly permanent, while the dollar’s international value 
remained surprisingly “strong.”  This combination of rising trade imbalance 
and strong or appreciating currency is critically important to the present 
argument.  As noted, a rise in the price of non-tradables relative to tradables 
represents dollar appreciation in real terms.  Conventional wisdom typically 
associates trade deficits with weak or weakening currency values.  But in this 
context, the function of the real appreciation is to allow resources to be 
moved into non-tradables production, while bridging the resulting shortfall of 
domestic tradables output by reducing exports and raising imports. 
At the time, however, the international strength of the U.S. currency was 
widely attributed to the dollar’s role as reserve currency and to the 
importance of U.S. assets as “safe haven” investments.  That argument 
undoubtedly has merit, but when dollar strength is accompanied by a 
deteriorating trade balance, that combination should raise alarm bells about 
resource pressures and overheating of the economy.  It should not be 
automatically treated as benign. 
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4. PULLING THE PIECES TOGETHER 
 
The highlights and essential elements of this paper’s take on the economic 
ups and downs of the past two decades may be summarized as follows. 
Adjustment in payments between the U.S. and the Eurozone went largely 
as expected under a floating rate system.  Dollar depreciation made 
expansionary monetary policy more effective initially, along the lines taught 
in the standard textbook and as understood by policy makers around the 
globe.  Unlike the textbook case, however, gradual closure of the output gap 
shifted more of the energy of monetary stimulation onto prices.  Any rise in 
domestic tradables costs and prices due to expenditure switching diminishes 
the benefits of nominal dollar depreciation by reducing the extent of real 
depreciation.  If the dollar-yuan rate had also been flexible, the tightening of 
resource constraints would have come faster and would have been more 
apparent.  That would have put greater pressure on prices and might have 
been enough to alert the authorities to the dangers of overheating. 
By fixing its currency to the dollar, China eliminated the payments 
adjustment mechanism that is typically associated with floating rates.  The 
main consequence was that imports from China remained cheap in terms of 
dollars and those imports contained huge quantities of consumer goods in 
wide use among U.S. households.  Having incapacitated the exchange rate 
channel as an avenue for external adjustment, the Chinese authorities then 
blocked the adjustment mechanism under fixed rate systems by sterilizing the 
contractionary effects of the money supply reduction brought about by the 
exchange market intervention.   
The ready availability of imported consumer products spelled trouble for 
U.S. tradables producers whose freedom to raise prices was limited.   With 
the stimulus of an easy-money policy, U.S. demand continued to rise, the 
output gap shrank and U.S. GDP moved beyond what was then believed to 
be full employment (natural rate) output without significant pressures in 
popular price indexes.  At these high levels of economic activity, the rising 
demand for non-tradables could not be met without drawing labor and other 
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productive resources away from tradables.  Pressures on wages and factor 
prices generally would be expected to rise throughout the economy in such 
circumstances.  These cost increases represent additional threats to U.S. 
international competitiveness.  Manufacturing and other U.S. tradables 
industries were shrinking and the current account was deteriorating. 
The puzzle is why these developments failed to alarm U.S. policy makers?  
A possible answer may lie in the tendency among policy makers to interpret 
inflation in housing as pure asset inflation.  A pure asset price bubble’s 
principal direct effect is to raise wealth, some of which will eventually affect 
demand for goods and services.  During the housing boom, however, the 
demand for new housing and new commercial property was in the first 
instance a demand for durable goods that needed to be produced and 
producing them requires inputs of labor, capital and other productive 
resources.  In a high-employment economy such a sustained surge in demand 
is bound to be inflationary.  This rise in non-tradables prices, together with a 
strong dollar, a shrinking U.S. tradables sector and a growing current account 
deficit should have provoked a better policy response than it did.   
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 The argument made in this paper is summarized in the preceding section. 
It seeks to understand macroeconomic developments in the U.S. economy 
since the early nineties.  The mixed exchange rate regime makes a key 
contribution to the ultimate outcome, but other factors also play a role.  
China’s exchange market intervention prevents the U.S. from enjoying a key 
benefit of floating rates, namely, timely adjustment of payments imbalances.  
Having fixed the rate, China again prevents normal adjustment patters from 
taking place by recycling intervention dollars back into the U.S. and thus 
effectively sterilizing the contractionary effects of the pegging operation.   
The large size of the Chinese economy and its ability to supply a wide range 
of products at stable prices is an important source of moderation in world 
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tradables prices.   
Distinction between tradables and non-tradables sectors helps in 
understanding these developments.  Variations in the relative price of 
tradables to non-tradables play a key role in shifting labor, capital and other 
productive resources between the two sectors.  As the U.S. expansion 
matures, relative inflation in non-tradables allows production in that sector to 
expand at the expense of tradables.  It is a key source of the dollar’s 
continued strength and of the large U.S. current account deficit. 
Housing is a major component of the non-tradables sector, not so much in 
the materials that go into dwellings and other structures, but in terms of labor 
and other factors of production needed to produce them.  Rapid inflation in 
housing prices and construction costs during the real estate bubble had major 
effects on the movement of relative prices in the U.S. economy and thus on 
the sectoral allocation of productive resources.  Hence, it is inappropriate to 
view this type of inflation as inconsequential for the real economy.    
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